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Abstract
With the referral ofthe Kodak - Fuji market access dispute to the World Trade Or-
ganization, the role of retail distribution channel control by incumbent finns as a
barrier to imports has drawn much interest. This paper reviews the issues from an
historical perspective and analyzes the difficulties facing finns attempting to sell their
products in other nations' automobile and photo supplies markets. There has been a
natural evolution ofretail distribution channels from "mom and pop" stores to hyper -
markets. Th~ earlier the stage in this evolutionary process at which a nation's retail
channels stand, the more difficult it is for consumer goods importers to secure their
own products' distribution. Volkswagen's early entry into the U.S. automobile mar-
ket and Nissan's later entry are analyzed as examples ofhow exclusive distribution
channels controlled by incumbents can be surmounted. Key aspects ofthe Kodak -
Fuji case are also examined. The advantages and disadvantages of manufacturers'
restraints on their distributors are so complex, the paper concludes, that it would be
difficult to adopt uniform international competition policies toward trade-impairing
vertical restraints.
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With tariffs having been reduced through successive rounds of multilateral trade
negotiations, structural barriers have moved to the forefront ofconcern as remaining
impediments to free and open international trade. Structural barriers assume many
fonns. They include domestic preferences and "co-production" requirements in
government and government-owned enterprise procurement decisions, "buy at home"
biases expressed by privately-owned national champion enterprises beholden to
government authority, regulatory procedures and standards that discriminate against
imported products (e.g., in new drug approvals, the allocation ofradio spectrum, and
automobile safety and pollution control equipment requirements), restraints on foreign
direct investment (which can either complement or substitute for cross-border trade),
buyers' cartels, and the control of distribution channels by domestic tradable goods
manufacturers.
Much ink has been spilled over several ofthese structural barriers -- so much that it is
difficult to contribute anything new on the subject. In this paper I therefore focus on
the "vertical restraints" question, i.e., on the impediments importers encounter
obtaining access to the wholesale and retail distribution channels needed to convey
their products to the ultimate consumer.
Although parallel examples can be found in other jurisdictions, claims that Japanese
distribution channels are skewed to the disadvantage ofimported products have been
a source of chronic tension between the United States and Japan. l During the late
1980s, Japan and the United States collaborated in "Structural Impediments
Initiatives" seeking to allay such complaints. Among other things, it was alleged that
weak enforcement ofthe Japanese anti-monopoly laws pennitted the perpetuation of
import-limiting vertical restraints. To clarify and perhaps remedy ,the situation, the
Japanese Fair Trade Commission, responsible for enforcing Japan's anti-monopoly
law, published in 1991 a 93-page English-language document spelling out its detailed
interpretation of the bounds between legality and illegality on such practices as
boycotts, exclusive dealing arrangements, full-line forcing, reciprocal dealing, sales
territory restrictions, rebates, resale price maintenance, acquisition of ownership
interests in vertical trading partners, and the abuse ofa dominant barg~ining position
by retailers.2 '
See Mitsuo Matsushita, "An International Comparison ofDistribution and Trade Practices and
Competition Policies," draft report of an International Comparative Study Group on
Distribution Structures and Trade Practices (Tokyo: Fair Trade Commission: 1986).
Fair Trade Commission, The Antimonopoly Act Guidelines Concerning Distribution Systems
and Business Practices (Tokyo: July 11, 1991).Despite (or perhaps because of) these efforts, allegations ofrestricted vertical access
have reappeared as major elements in U.S. firms' complaints against Japanese
business practices and as possible explanations for the persistent deficit run by the
United States on its trade with Japan. On May 16, 1995, the United States
government announced that it would levy 100 percent tariffs on 13 imported Japanese
luxury car models unless U.S. manufacturers' products gained substantially enhanced
access to Japanese showrooms (for finished vehicles) and original vehicle and repair
markets (for partS).3 The dispute was resolved, at least temporarily, and the tariff
threat was withdrawn through last-minute negotiations evoking indefinite promises of
improved access to Japanese markets.4 Two days after punitive auto tariffs were
preliminarily announced, the Eastman Kodak Company filed with the U.S.
government a complaint alleging that, in league with Japan's Ministry ofInternational
Trade and Industry, the Fuji Photo Film Company and its network of domestic
wholesalers and distributors sustained anticompetitive practices to limit the Japanese
market access of Kodak :film and print paper.5 -In August 1996, the matter was
referred by the United States'to the World Trade Organization for resolution.
These two disputes -- one involving a big-ticket item sold through specialized retail
outlets, another a low-price convenience good sold through a vast and diversified
array ofretailers -- will provide the organizing focus for this paper. Despite having
spent all of three weeks in Japan, the author cannot claim to be an expert on the
economics ofJapanese marketing channels. Therefore, a broader perspective will be
adopted. The paper addresses more generally how vertical restraints can affect
producers' access to channels ofdistribution, the historical context within which U.S.
and foreign automobile and photographic film manufacturers squared offto compete
in each others' home markets, the strategies employed by importers to hurdle
distribution channel access barriers, and the successes and failures of competition
policy (or in the, United States, antitrust policy) in its diverse attempts to minimize
those barriers.
2 The Broad Historical Context
To sell their goods, manufacturers need access to consumers. Both the size of
individual retail outlets and the number of outlets under common control can affect
the ability of imported goods to reach consumers. Small stores ha~'e very limited
shelfspace. Except in the case ofnarrowly specialized outlets, e.g., boutiques, this
"100% Tariffs Set on 13 Top Models ofJapanese Cars," New York Times, May 17, 1995, p. 1.
"U.S. Settles Trade Dispute, Averting Billions in Tariffs on Japanese Luxury Autos," New
York Times, June 29, 1995, p. 1.
"Trade Fight with Japan Is Widening," New York Times, May 19, 1995, p. D1.
2plus the need for keeping their merchandise procurement activities simple requires
limiting the number ofbrands displayed -- commonly, to only a single brand -- in any
given product category. More often than not, the brand chosen will be one that is
well known by all consumers, which usually means a popular domestic brand.
Department stores and supermarkets, in contrast, appeal to consumers partly through
the wide array of brands they stock. This often means that imported products can
more readily secure a shelf space niche. In addition, multi-unit chains have
purchasing departments that can search far and wide for products that will enhance
their shelf display appeal, and this again provides an opportunity for imported
products.
There have been several revolutions in the organization of retail distribution and
hence the characteristic size and geographic scope ofretailing firms. During the 19th
Century, the preponderant retail marketing channel in the United States was the
general store in small towns or, in larger cities, the-small, conveniently located "Mom
and Pop" store specializing in a relatively narrow array ofitems. Roughly a century
ago competition began impinging upon these small retailers in two main forms -- from
large department stores merchandising a much wider array ofgoods, typically sold at
prices approximating those charged by smaller, more specialized, outlets; and
(especially for rural consumers) from the large mail-order houses such as Sears
Roebuck and Montgomery Ward, whose product assortment was much more diverse
and lower-priced than that of local merchants, but lacked the advantages of
immediacy and on-the-spot inspection. As the 20th Century progressed, new
competition arose from chain stores, first in .general merchandise (e.g., the "five and
dime" stores such as Woolworth's) and then from the food chains (led by A&P). The
early chain store outlets were typically small and conveniently located. However, the
increased mobility conferred by nearly universal automobile ownership, combined
with rising aftluence in the wake of World War II, led to the emergence of
supermarkets and giant mall-based discount stores offering a great diversity of
products at prices kept low by self-service, economies ofscale at the store level, and
economies of large-scale purchasing and logistic infrastructure spanning multiple
units.
Small, locally-owned retailers fought the invasion oflarge discounters in their home
markets and in the halls of Congress. In 1936, informed by a Federal Trade
Commission staffstudy that the"chain stores owed at least part oftheir cost advantage
to discriminatory price discounts extracted from manufacturers, Congress passed the
Robinson-Patman Act, which declared many forms of competition-lessening price
discrimination illegal. The intent of the law, according to its co-sponsor, Wright
Patman, was "to give the little business fellows a square deal."6 In response to heavy
"Robinson-Patman: Dodo or Golden Rule?" Business Week, November 12, 1966, p. 66.
3lobbying, led by the retail pharmacists' trade association, Congress passed in 1937 the
Miller-Tydings Resale Price Maintenance Act, which exempted from antitrust
penalties most minimum price-setting agreements between manufacturers and retailers
in states with permissive laws. The intent was to prevent chains and discount houses
from undercutting branded good prices specified by manufacturers and charged by
smaller retailers. Neither law, however, was successful in stemming the tide toward
large-scale retailing. Powerful retail buyers circumvented the Robinson-Patman law
by integrating backward into the manufacture oftheir own products, by encouraging
their suppliers to sell only in large volumes at discounted prices, and by exploiting the
law's numerous loopholes in tenacious court battles. Resale price maintenance
(RPM) was undermined because many manufacturers chose not to enforce the law
against price-cutting merchants who were often their best customers and because
price-maintaining retailers found their sales eroded by mail order shipments from
states with laws less supportive ofRPM. When the Miller-Tydings Act and a later
reinforcing statute were repealed in 1975, only an estimated four percent of U.S.
retail sales involved minimum price-fixed items.
The revolutions in retailing occurred later in some nations than in others. Having
grown up in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s, I experienced directly the
progression from small to large-unit chain stores and then to supermarkets and
shopping centers. Having lived in Germany for extended periods between the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s, I witnessed those revolutions again, roughly two decades later.
There were several reasons for the delay ofwhat eventually seemed inevitable: a later
ascentto postwar aflluence; concomitant lags in the spread ofautomobiles (enhancing
consumers' ability to transport large purchases) and large refrigerators (permitting
once-a-week food shopping); higher average population density, which raised the
opportunity cost of parking space;' and (until 1973) permissive laws concerning
resale price maintenance.8
Congestion and high parking space costs explain why many small neighborhood stores survive
!n New York City and some sections ofother large U. S. cities.
However, the number ofagreements notified to the Federal Cartel Office was declining even
before formal RPM agreements were effectively outlawed in 1973. See F. D. Boggis, "The
European Economic Community," in Basil S. Yamey, ed., Resale Price Maintenance (Chicago:
AIdine, 1966), pp. 205-206.
Sweden altered its law to discourage RPM beginning in 1954. According to the analysis by U.
af Trolle in the Yamey compendium, p. 134, "dramatic changes in the structure of Swedish
distribution" -- notably, the emergence of self-service stores and low-price supermarkets --
"would not have taken place" without the abolition ofa rigid RPM system and new firm entry
restrictions.
4France was tardier than Gennany in the transition to very large retail outlets, in part
because shopping at small neighborhood stores was even more deeply entrenched in
the French way of life than it was in Gennany. The first French supennarket was
opened in 1957; the fIrst giant discount store (Hypennarche) in 1963.9 Although
France passed a law declaring resale price maintenance presumptively illegal in 1953,
many manufacturers, at the urging of their smaller merchant customers, refused to
supply retailers who sold their products at discount prices. Discount store pioneer
Edouard Leclerc led a struggle which eventually elicited the intervention ofPresident
Charles de Gaulle and a 1962 high court decision declaring such resale price-
maintaining refusals to sell illegal. 10 The small merchants fought back by inducing the
French Parliament, where they enjoyed stronger political support than in the
administration, to pass a series of laws culminating in 1973 in Ie loi Royer (a law
introduced by M. Royer), which required anyone proposing to establish a retail outlet
with a selling area in excess of 1,500 square meters (1,000 square meters in smaller
cities) to obtain approval from a local plannin-g commission, nine of whose 20
members were local merchants. 11 The early attempts of hypennarket advocates to
circumvent or overturn Ie loi Royer achieved only mixed success. Nevertheless,
according to Adams, the spread ofdiscount retailing in France was accelerated by the
campaign M. Leclerc and others sustained against the boycotting ofdiscounters and
Ie loi Royer.12
Japan has lagged behind the United States and major western European nations in the
movement toward large retail outlets. Recent national statistical sources reveal the
number ofretail establishments (excluding auto dealers, gasoline and fuel dealers, and
restaurants) per thousand inhabitants (first column) and average employment per
Similarly, in the United Kingdom, according to Ann Rosemarie Everton, "With the advent of
the Resale Prices Act of 1964 ... and the eventually virtual prohibition of [resale price
maintenance], the way was opened for the lawful pursuit of pricing policies including price
discrimination, and this contributed to the blossoming of new shopping forms and the
concomitant demise of the corner shop. II "Discrimination and Predation in the United
Kingdom: Small Grocers and Small Bus Companies -- A Decade of Domestic Competition
Policy," 14 European Competition Law Review 6, 7 (January/February 1993),'
William James Adams, Restructuring the French Economy (Washington: Brookings Institution,
1989), pp. 220-221.
10 Adams, supra note 9, pp. 224-229.
11 Adams, supra note 9, p. 209-210. On similar efforts in Spain, see "Small Family-Run Stores in
Spain Are Fighting to Limit the Hypermarkets," New York Times, January 6, 1996, p. 18.
12 Adams, supra note 9, pp. 228-229. See also "Over There: Teardrops on the Shelves," Business
Week, February 12, 1996, p. 6.
5establishment (second colwnn) in Japan and four comparable nations to be as
follows: 13
Stores per 1.000 Employees
Population per Store
Japan (1988) 11.79 4.09
United States (1987) 6.52 6.01
Gennany (1992) 6.16 5.79
United Kingdom (1990) 6.08 7.07
Sweden (1992) 6.42 n.a.
Takatoshi Ito reports that the average Japanese retail outlet had 55.4 square meters of
floor space in 1982, compared to 167.9 square meters in Gennany.14 No U.S.
comparison was attempted. The U.S. Census ofRetail Trade for 1987 reports only
limited floor space statistics. For 9,903 outlets classified as department stores
(excluding food retailing outlets), the average selling space was 6,650 square meters
per store.IS Japanese statistics tally a total of 2,343 "large-scale" retail outlets in
1987, including both department stores and retail super-markets.16 The average
13 Sources: Japan Statistical Yearbook: 1995, p. 396; Statistical Abstract ofthe United States:
1993, p. 775; StatistiSches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: 1995, p. 261; UK.
Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract ofStatistics: 1995, Table 11.1; and Statistisk Arsbok
for Sverige: 1995, p. 118. Not counted in the U.S. employment data, and, from the definitions
given, presumably also in the foreign data are self-employed employers. If one adds to each
US. retail outlet with no reported employees the services of the proprietor as a single
employee, the average employment count per U.S. establishment rises to 6.98.
In The Japanese Economy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), p. 287, Takatoshi Ito reports a
study by M. Maruyama and others showing th,5lt Japan had 14.5 retail establishments per 1,000
residents in.1982. It is unclear whether the data are completely comparable to those reported
above.
14 Ito, supra note 13.
IS US. Bureau ofthe Census, 1987 Census ofRetail Trade, "Miscellaneous Subjects," RC87-S-4
(October 1990), p. 4-139.
16 Japan Statistical Yearbook: 1995, supra note 13, at pp. 398-399.
6selling space per outlet was 6,798 square meters -- quite close to the average for the
4.2 times as many U.S. department stores. The 125,595 U.S. grocery stores of all
sizes, large and small, operating at the end of 1987 had an average selling area of553
square meters. No comparable statistic for all Japanese retail grocery outlets was
reported. It seems reasonable to infer from the Ito data that the average Japanese
store was much smaller.
The factors that inhibited the spread of large-scale retailing in postwar Europe recur
in Japan. High population densities, high land costs, and road congestion well
beyond levels prevailing in most American and European cities discourage the use of
automobiles as a means of conveying large purchases. Japan's Fair Trade
Commission was generous in granting exemptions to resale price maintenance
prohibitions contained in the 1953 anti-monopoly law. Informal attempts by
manufacturers to set retail price floors through suasion and boycotts ofprice-cutting
retailers were effective until they were challenged in a precedent-setting 1993 court
decision precipitated by a discounter's law suit.!7 The Large Retail Store Law of
1974, amended in 1979, emplaced time-consuming and sometimes formidable
procedural hurdles that must be surmounted before sizeable new retail outlets can be
constructed. 18 Merchandise typically moves onto retailers' shelves in Japan through
one and sometimes two tiers of wholesalers, many of which are controlled directly
(through vertical stockholdings) or informally (through long-standing relationships) by
the manufacturers whose products are being distributed. The owners of small retail
shops are often alumni of the manufacturers whose products they stock, given a
"golden handshake" at age 55 and required to make ends meet by embracing a new
profession. These circumstances and limited shelf space often lead retailers, by
explicit contract or (more frequently) by informal understanding, to handle only the
products of their traditional suppliers and not to sell competing brands, including
imported brands. Consequently, as Takatoshi Ito reports: 19
The Japanese distribution system has become the focus ofextensive criticism,
both abroad and within Japan. The Japanese market is "closed," complain
many foreign manufact-urers who have tried and failed to export to Japan.
Their complaints center around the hostility ofthe Japanese distribution system
to new entrants. Japanese wholesalers and retailers are said to "be unwilling to
put discounted imported commodities on the shelves, because they are
pressured by the distributors ofcompeting Japanese products ... not to do so.
17 "Japanese Court Orders Reinstatement of Discounter Terminated by Cosmetics Maker,"
Antitrust and Trade Regulation Report, October 7, 1993, pp. 479-480.
18 See Ito, supra note 13, at pp. 394-396.
19 Ito, supra note 13, at p. 385.
7Nevertheless, in Japan, as in western Europe during earlier decades, there are signs of
gradual change -- more glacial, to be sure, than the developments in Germany and
France. As a Japanese Fair Trade Commission study group reported:20
There is much in this overseas criticism that deserves serious consideration, but
there is also much that goes beyond the realm ofcompetition policy and public
policy.... Distribution structure and business practices are not artificially
designed ... in any country. Instead, they evolve naturally over the long years
ofhistory, having a certain rationality in light ofthe prevailing constraints that
govern social behavior, and there is thus a limit to how much policy actions can
influence these cultural-heritage aspects.
Although there are good reasons for expecting imported goods to experience
difficulty reaching consumers, given the small-store environment prevailing in Japan
and persisting to some extent even in France, qualifications and exceptions must be
recognized. W. 1. Adams concludes his analysis of the French experience with an
observation that the rise ofdiscount retailing may have facilitated the introduction of
foreign products into French markets.21 He notes, however, a 1983 study finding no
correlation between import penetration ratios and large outlets' share of white goods
(e.g., refrigerators, washing machines, etc.) and clothing sales in France.22 In white
goods, small shops stocked products imported from low-cost nations to compete with
and differentiate their offerings from those of the larger stores. In clothing,
manufacturers procured semi-finished items from low-wage nations, adding only
finishing touches, and independent wholesalers sold the garments they obtained
abroad to both small traditional retail shops and chains.
3 Access to Automobile Consumers
Some of the most insistent complaints during recent years concerning restricted
access to the Japanese market have come from U.S. automobile manufacturers. In
the dispute that escalated to a crisis point during 1995, U.S. automobile makers levied
five specific allegations: (1) that restrictive zoning and high land prices made it
20 Matsushita, "An International Comparison," supra note 1, at p. 23. See also F. M. Scherer,
Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy (Washington: Brookings: 1994), pp.
74-78.
21 Adams, supra note 9, at p. 242. See also p. 208.
22 Adams, supra note 9, at p. 242, note 95, referencing Frederic Jenny, "Rapport sur la Relation
Pouvant Exister entre les Pratiques de Certain Types de Distributeurs et la Penetration
Croissante de Notre Marche par les Produits Etrangers." Adams' discussion ofthe evidence
has been supplemented through correspondence with Professor Jenny.
8virtually impossible to establish their own dealerships within Japan?3 (2) that the
retailers selling Japanese cars in Japan deal exclusively in the vehicles ofthe domestic
manufacturer whose franchise they hold, or, ifthey handle American cars at all, do so
unenthusiastically; (3) that because ofrestrictive governmental regulations governing
annual auto safety inspections and long-standing ties between some 20,000
"designated" repair shops and manufacturers, opportunities for U.S. companies to sell
repair parts to Japanese automobile service outlets are constrained; (4) that despite
the sharp fall ofthe dollar relative to the yen, U.S. sales oforiginal equipment parts to
Japan increased only trivially; and (5) that in their rapidly growing American
transplant manufacturing operations, Japanese companies favored home sources or
U.S. sources owned by Japanese parents over U.S. producers in procuring original
equipment parts to be assembled into Japanese nameplate cars. Through more
aggressive enforcement of Japan's anti-monopoly law against exclusive dealing
arrangements and the other vertical restraints underlying charges (l) - (4), it has been
argued, the structural barriers to U.S. vehicle-and parts sales in Japan might be
reduced. The fifth allegation, concerning purchases for use within the United States,
has no· import restraint implications and hence will not be considered in detail here,
even though such purchases probably represent the largest sales opportunity for U.S.
parts manufacturers.24
U.S. manufacturers were not always unsuccessful in selling their products to Japanese
consumers.25 A significant demand for motor-propelled vehicles first emerged in
Japan to support reconstruction after the great earthquake of 1923. Ford Motor
C0J!lP~~was the first to respond, and in 1925, it established a Yokohama plant to
assemble parts imported from the United States. General Motors and Chrysler
followed with "knockdown" assembly plants in 1927 and 1929 respectively.
Between 1925 and 1932, Japanese motor vehicle imports included 26,412 assembled
vehicles and 132,425 "knockdown" vehicle kits. Domestic production in the same
interval totalled 3,481 units, although companies such as Nissan accumulated,
experience producing some parts for U.S. companies' assembly operations. As the
military gained political strength during the 1930s and feared dependence upon
23 See "Cars, Trade, Power, and the Legacy ofFrustration," New York Times, May 8, 1995, p.
D2, in which a Ford Motor Company executive is quoted, "You can build a whole plant in
China for what it costs to open five new showrooms in Tokyo."
24 Thus, in 1994, Japanese transplant car assemblers in the United States purchased approximately
$17 billion in parts from U.S.-based sources. Parts exports from the United States to Japan
were $3 billion; assembled motor vehicle exports amounted to less than $2 billion. "U.S. Plans
To Threaten Japan with Tariffs," New York Times, April 13, 1995, p. D7.
25 This paragraph is based upon Hiroko Yotsumoto, "The Japanese Automobile Industry Before
World Warn," term paper submitted at the John F. Kennedy School ofGovernment, 1995.
9foreign sources, measures were taken by the Japanese government to encourage
domestic production. The Automobile Manufacturing Industry Law of 1936 licensed
Toyota, Nissan, and Diesel Motor to produce vehicles under government protection
and restricted assembly operations by the American manufacturers. General Motors
and Ford tried to remain in the Japanese market by affiliating with Japanese firms, but
those efforts failed, and in 1939 the U.S. companies terminated their operations.
During the late 1940s American companies again became the leading motor vehicle
suppliers in Japan, but the demand for their products was limited severely by the
poverty of a war-shattered economy; the unsuitability of large American cars to
narrow, rough Japanese roads?6 and (when the economy began recovering) high
protective tariffs. The Korean War provided a strong impetus to the renaissance ofa
domestic automobile industry.27 It is unclear whether U.S. manufacturers attempted
to reestablish assembly operations in Japan. If they did, it is likely that their
investments would have been restricted by a Japanese government eager to protect
the development of a viable domestic industry.28 What is clear is that by 1960
imports had shrunk to only one percent of the Japanese market and domestic
producers had built strong retail distribution channels to serve rapidly growing
demand.
3.1 !foreign Firms' Experience Penetrating U.S. Markets
How does a foreign producer secure channels ofdistribution after being absent from
the market, during which time local manufacturers have established their own
exclusive retail dealer networks? For Japan I have virtually no evidence on this
question. However, much can be learned from the experience offoreign automobile
makers who successfully penetrated the U.S. market, where American :firms enjoyed
at least as strong a position as Japanese manufacturers possess in their home market.
26 The Japanese preference for small cars continues to limit U.S. manufacturers' market
opportunities, absent the development ofnew cars especially suited to Japanese demands. In
1994, 79.5 percent of all new Japanese cars (excluding mini-cars with engine displacements
below 660 cubic centimeters) had engine displacements between 660 and 2000 cc -- a category
in which"the U.S. Big Three offered no models. In the above 3000 cc category, U.S. auto
makers achieved a 1994 market share estimated at 28.5 percent. Data from the Japan
Automobile Manufactuers Association and the Japan Automobile Importers Association.
27 See David Halberstam, The Reckoning (New York: Morrow, 1986) (on the evolution of
Nissan).
28 See Ito, supra note 13, at pp. 201-202, on MITI's unsuccessful efforts in 1955 and 1961 to
limit the number ofdomestic companies producing automobiles.
10That the exclusive dealing relationships inhibiting U.S. firms' access to Japanese auto
consumers should be mirrored in the United States is not a foregone conclusion.
Antitrust fears could have induced greater openness. Indeed, a leading Japanese
antitrust scholar observed in a discussion of exclusive dealership arrangements that
"The easy accessibility ofthe U.S. distribution structure has clearly been one factor
working to the advantage of Japanese companies wishing to export to the United
States. "29 Under the somewhat unclear legal precedents existing during the 1950s, a
small auto manufacturer could successfully defend itself against antitrust charges
when it cancelled a dealer's franchise for diffusing sales efforts by taking on a
competing auto line, but it is unlikely that the Big Three, with their large market
shares, could have done SO.30 However, auto manufacturers had means more subtle
than explicit contractual restrictions for maintaining the exclusivity of their dealers.
The dealer who strayed too far from the fold was likely to have difficulty securing
timely delivery of the models it sought -- especially "hot" selling cars in times of
shortage. Despite the passage of so-called "dealer day in court" laws inhibiting
franchise cancellations withoutjust cause,31 unfaithful dealers were also susceptible to
various other forms ofharassment by their manufacturer-suppliers.
As aresult, and probably also because scale economies can be realized from dealer
specialization when a sufficient volume ofa single manufacturer's cars can be sold,32
most ofthe dealerships handling the leading American producers' cars have remained
effectively exclusive to a single manufacturer's offerings.33 In 1960, for example,
although 33 percent of all General Motors car dealers in the United States carried
more than one GM nameplate (e.g., Pontiac and Cadillac), a mere 0.5 percent of"Big
Four" dealers stocked the cars ofcompeting manufact-urers.34 However, among the
,
29 Matsushita, supra note I, at p. 6.
30 Compare Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F 2nd 268 (1954); in re General Motors, 34
F.T.C. Reports 58 (1941); and (on exclusive dealing in petroleum retailing), Standard Oil of
California et al. v. US., 337 U.S. 293 (1949). See also Report of the Attorney General's
National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws (USGPO: March 31, 1955), pp. 141-145.
31 Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, Public Law 1026 (August 1956), 15 US.C. 1221-25.
32 See B. P. Pashigian, The Distribution ofAutomobiles: An Economic Analysis ofthe Franchise
System (prentice-Hall: 1961).
33 On changes becoming evident during the mid-1990s, see "Revolution in the Showroom,"
Business Week. Feburary 19, 1996, pp. 70-75.
34 Stanley E. Boyle, A Reorganization ofthe US. Automobile Industry, Committee Print, US.
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly (February 28,
1974), pp. 192-196.
116,023 dealerships carrying imported cars other than those produced by foreign
branches ofa U.S. manufacturer, only 20 percent dealt exclusively in the products of
a single company.35 For importers, the easiest, ifnot the most effective, access to the
U.S. market was through a dealer marketing other foreign cars. By 1995, the
situation had changed appreciably. Among the 17,872 dealers holding franchises to
sell new U.S. Big Three cars, 2.0 percent carried competing companies' vehicles.
Among the 4,545 dealerships specializing in imported cars, 22 percent carried
competing makes.36
Most of the foreign cars that sought U.S. sales during the period following World
War II were in fact sold through multi-manufacturer foreign car specialists. Their
success was characteristicaly modest. Volkswagen was the first to pursue an
alternative strategy aggressively. Its first two attempts to establish dealerships during
the late 1940s were abject failures. 37 In 1950, a distributor also selling Porsches and
Jaguars was enlisted in New York. Through that distributor's efforts and word-of-
mouth from American soldiers returning from European tours of duty, other foreign
car dealers began adding VW to their lineups. As sales rose, Volkswagen in 1954 '
reorganized its haphazard network and dispatched two key persons from ge~any to
build'an effective distribution system. Its chiefrecognized that in the United States "a
completely new structure was needed to sell VWs effectively, different from the
slightly tatty cinder-block establishments maintained by many multibrand foreign-car
retailers. "38 VWs eastern United States head travelled from city to city interviewing
potential dealers and, for those Who joined up, "encouraging, pushing, checking,
35 Boyle, supra note 34, at pp. 196-199.
36 Automotive News 1995 Market Data Book (Detroit: 1995), p. 105. On average, imported car
dealers carried 2.75 brands.
A dealership is defined here as a single physical facility. Separate facilities owned by a single
parent may deal in different manufacturers' brands and still be deemed exclusive. The
Manhattan telephone directory for 1995 lists four Potamkin auto dealerships at separate
locations -- one handling Cadillacs, Buicks, and Chevrolets; one Chryslers, Plymouths, and
Dodges; one Mazda, Toyota, and Volkswagen; and one Sterling and Mitsubishl. In 1987, the
ten largest new and used car retailing "enterprises" in the United States, each with total sales of
$250 million or more, owned an average of 15.4 establishments per enterprise. The average
number of establishments for all 41,351 reporting enterprises was 1.06 per corporate entity.
U.S. Bureau ofthe Census, Enterprise Statistics: 1987, Company Summary, ES87-3, p. 89.
37 See Walter Henry Nelson, Small Wonder: The Amazing Story ofVolkswagen (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1967), pp. 173-174, from which much ofthis account is drawn.
38 Frank Rowsome, Jr., Think Small: The Story ofThose Volkswagen Ads (Brattleboro: Stephen
Greene Press, 1970), p. 46.
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admonishing -- and always infecting us with his complete and utter faith in the small
car. "39 •..
"One of the fIrst things we had to do," remember[ed] one veteran of these
visits, "was to get in there and have them clean up the dirt in their-workshops.
We wanted these to be neat and unifonn ... so that Volkswagen facilities could
have the same single and recognizable image in the country that the car had.
We wanted our workshops to be attractive and tidy, even to have flowers
placed out front if possible, so ·as to make them really stand out from other
dealerships."40
Seeking to avoid the problems that beset British, French, Italian, and Swedish
imports, Volkswagen placed great stress on having its new dealers maintain repair
facilities that could provide high-quality service for every car sold. The fonnula was
sufficiently successful that, according to Nelson, many of the early VW dealers
became millionaires.41 By 1959, Volkswagen's annual sales in the United States had
climbed to 120,442 new sedans (i.e., Beetles) plus 30,159 minibuses and trucks
Between 1960 and 1966, Volkswagens comprised 57 percent of the 3.3 million
foreign cars sold in the United States.42
i
During the late 1950s, Volkswagen began insisting that its dealers sell Volkswagens
exclusively from buildings rigorously standardized to have the unique Volkswagen
look. 43 However, this plus its attempts to specify the prices at which dealers sold
drew an antitrust challenge from the Department of Justice. (Because VW orders
were chronically backlogged during the late 1950s, most sales were at list price.)
Rejecting Volkswagen's motion to dismiss, a federal district judge distinguished the
Volkswagen case from others in which exclusive dealing arrangements had been
39 Nelson, supra note 37, at p. 191.
40 Nelson, supra note 37, at pp. 195-196.
41 For an extraordinarily detailed study of the profitability of U.S. Volkswagen dealers, see
Veikko Leivo, Influence of the Location and Size of the Automobile Dealership Upon Its
Profitability (Helsinki: Helsinki Research Institute for Business Economics, 1967).
42 Nelson, supra note 37, at pp. 213, 215, and 307; and Lawrence 1. White, The Automobile
Industry Since 1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 1971), pp. 295-304.
43 Nelson, supra note 37, at 205-207. Nelson quotes VW chairman Heinz Nordhoffas suggesting
that his U.S. representatives "go after people who had no automobile franchises at aU, because
so many ofthe best dealers had been taken on by Detroit."
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approved because ofthe resale price maintenance provisions.44 In 1962, Volkswagen
agreed to a consent decree barring it from setting resale prices and requiring it to send
to its dealers a letter stating that "Volkswagen dealers may sell and service other
makes ofautomobiles," but noting also the Justice Department's recognition "that we
may insist that each distributor and dealer fairly and fully discharge his responsibility
under the Volkswagen dealer franchise agreement."45 As events ensued, VW's retail
channels remained substantially exclusive. In 1966, four of its nearly 1,000 U.S.
dealers also sold Mercedes-Benz cars and some 15 to 20 percent sold Porsches (with
whose producer VW had an ongoing design consultation relationship).46
The next outstanding success offoreign car manufacturers in entering the U.S. market
was achieved by several Japanese fInns, notably, Toyota, Honda, and Nissan. David
Halberstam's Pulitzer Prize winning book provides an enthralling account of Nissan's
entry.47 The fIrst Nissan expeditionary force found Nissan's only car model, the
Datsun, ill-suited to the American market:- "simply terrible, crude and
underpowered."48 But in 1958 a beachhead was established on the West Coast for
the sale ofpickup trucks. As Volkswagen had done earlier, after the fIrst few dealers
were recruited, executives were dispatched from Japan in 1960 to take charge -- one
on the West Coast and one on the East Coast. The Middlewest, where wide open
spaces favored large cars, was temporarily neglected. The West Coast efforts were at
fIrst more successful. Nissan's West Coast head recognized early on that in America,
unlike Japan, the dealer network was crucial:49
If the dealers were strong and vital, then the company might succeed....
Gradually [Katayama] created a network ofdealers along the West Coast that
he was very proud of.... They were, in truth, a most unlikely group, with a high
iIlcidence ofeccentricity. Many ofthem were men who had been around cars
44 US. v. Volkswagen of America Inc., et aI., CCH 1960 Trade Cases para. 69,643, District
Court ofNew Jersey (February 1960). But see the decision in a parallel private suit, in which
Volkswagen's termination ofa dealer who also sold a competing brand was sustained. Reliable
Volkswagen Sales and Service Co. v. Volkswagen of America Inc. et aI., CCH 1960 Trade
Cases para. 69,644, District Court ofNew Jersey (February 1960).
45 US. v. Volkswagen ofAmerica Inc., CCH 1962 Trade Cases para. 70,256, District ofNew
Jersey (May 1962).
46 Nelson, supra note 37, at p. 209.
47 Halberstam, supra note 27, especially Chapters 16,24, and 25.
48 Halberstam, supra note 27, at p. 420.
49 Halberstarn, supra note 27, at p. 422.
14~ all their lives, often as repainnen, but had never been able to come up with the
large amount ofmoney required for an American dealership.
As one early Datsun dealer recounted:~o
"There was no way someone like me -- a mechanic -- was ever going to have a
Ford dealership.... The best I could hope for was a used-car dealership, and a
lot of us Datsun dealers had been in the used-car business, and we knew the
poorer customers [those who bought inexpensive, underpowered early
Japanese cars] very well."
To win dealers' loyalty, Nissan offered them an 18 to 20 percent gross profit from the
average car's sale, in contrast to the 12 to 13 percent margin customary with
American manufact-urers. As with Volkswagen a decade earlier, many early signers
became millionaires.51 Despite language difficulties, which found him speaking "a
kind of Janglish," Nissan's top West Coast representative exhibited such winning
enthusiasm that many Americans reached out to help him. 52 Studying Volkswagen's
experience, he became -"absolutely convinced that the most important factor in
gaining success was providing adequate service. "~3 He recognized that "Volkswagen
customers believed that they were treated better, respected more, than they would be
if they were trying to buy at the lower end of the American lines."~4 At first, the
Datsun car was so primitive that it could only be sold at a huge discount relative to
American cars and the Volkswagen. But Nissan sent engineers to the United States
who tinkered with their product, suggested countless minor improvements in its
design, and pleaded with reluctant company leaders in Tokyo to design a completely
new model better-suited to the U.S. market. Finally, in 1969, the engineers' wish
came true in the Datsun 510, patterned after BMW's 1600, but priced at $1,800, well
below the BMWs $3,200 price.~5 Nissan sales soared, among other things inducing
the defection of some Volkswagen dealers. As other Japanese car makers
experienced analogous successes, imports from Japan exceeded those from Germany
50 Halberstam, supra note 27, at 422.
51 Halberstam. supra note 27, at pp. 422 and 435.
52 Halberstam, supra note 27, at p. 423.
53 Halberstam, supra note 27, at p. 424.
54 Halberstam. supra note 27, at p. 425.
55 Halberstam, supra note 27, at p. 442.
15for the first time in 1972 and, beginning in 1974, moved rapidly ahead of Gennan
imports.
From these two case studies some preliminary morals can be drawn. It is not easy to
build strong auto distribution for imported cars in a market already well-supplied by
domestic models, even in the American market, which to the first Nissan observer
"appeared blithely open ... the only regulation seemed to be that the cars must have
sealed-beam headlights from General Electric. "56 Exclusive dealing is as common, at
least for the leading car makes, in the United States as it is in Japan. It is not
sufficient merely to piggy-back one's offerings into retail outlets already selling other
makes; a dedicated dealer network must be built. For the missionaries who lead the
recruitment effort far from home, language difficulties must be overcome, but
unbounded enthusiasm more than compensates. In the Japanese case, but not initially
for the Beetle, designs had to undergo significant adaptations to local demand
idiosyncracies. Neither Volkswagen nor the Japanese manufacturers achieved their
market penetration by focusing their attention on political decision-makers; they
succeeded at the grass-roots market level, in the repair bays, and in the design shops.
3.2 Antitrust and Auto Parts Distribution Channels
U.S. automobile manufacturers have complained that both in Japan and in the United
States, Japanese auto assemblers and (only in Japan) repair shops buy too few parts
from U.S. sources. They have proposed two kinds ofremedies: "managed trade,"
i.e., government-imposed requirements that some minimum fraction ofJapanese parts
be purchased from U.S. sources; and invigorated enforcement of Japan's anti-
monopoly law to break open de facto exclusive dealing relationships between
manufacturers and their suppliers. Here I emphasize the competition policy facet of
the debate.
For preliminary perspective on the issues, it must be recognized that the structures of
Japanese and U.S. automobile manufacturers differ markedly. The U.S. firms are
much more integrated vertically than their Japanese counterparts. Reliable data on
this point are difficult to obtain, but the estimates ofan DECD team will suffice.57 In
1985, General Motors is said to have procured from internal company divisions
roughly half, and Ford Motor Company 38 percent, ofthe parts they as~embled into
automobiles. In contrast, Nissan, Honda, and Toyota sourced 17 to 19 percent of
their parts internally. The Japanese companies purchased the vast majority oftheir
parts from other firms, with many ofwhom they had "vertical Keiretsu" relationships
through partial shareholdings and loans. Ifa level playing field had to be created, it
56 Halberstam, supra note 27, at p. 293.
57 Globalization ofIndustrial Activities: Four Case Studies (paris: OECD, 1992), p. 43.
16would undoubtedly be easier to merge the Japanese Keiretsu parts makers into their
customer fIrms than to break offGeneral Motors and Ford parts divisions from their
parents (although Chrysler and to a lesser degree Ford did divest some parts
operations under fmancial stress during the early 1980s). But this is hardly what the
U.S. firms have sought. And for them to chafe about Keiretsu ties when they have
approached similar parts procurement challenges by fully integrating their operations
is disingenuous.
Even when there are no interlocking ownership ties, Japanese auto manufacturers
have soug!lt to maintain strong long-term relationships with their parts suppliers
because it is their traditional way of doing business and because Kanban Gust-in-
time) production requires close coordination, both in planning and logistics, between
parts suppliers and assembly lines. During the past decade u.s. auto makers have
recognized the attractions ofjust-in-time organization.58 They have also discovered
that entering long-term contracts with firms -supplying components subject to
substantial product-specifIc economies ofscale can be more economical than dividing
orders between two or more vendors and forcing the vendors to compete each year
for shares ofthe total production requirements -- the traditional Detroit approach. In
1985, for example, the Ford Motor Company negotiated a long-term contract to
produce all the automatic transmissions for its new World Truck line to a joint
venture between Eaton Corporation and Clark Equipment Company. The Dana
Corporation, which had previously supplied transmissions for Ford trucks, was left
out in the cold. Dana sued, alleging antitrust violations,59 but withdrew its action
when itrecognized that litigation could harm its long-term relationship with Ford for
the production ofother automobile components.
The Federal antitrust enforcement agencies have intervened repeatedly in attempts to
wedge open market opportunities for replacement parts suppliers within the United
States.60 Once a consumer has purchased an automobile, he or she is locked into a
continuing stream of replacement parts purchases. Auto manufacturers wielded
threats offranchise cancellation to induce their dealers to purchase replacement parts
exclusively from the manufacturer and sometimes to meet ambitious quotas for the
58 See James P. Womack et aI., The Machine That Changed the World (New York: Macmillan,
1990), Chapters 4 and 6.
59 Dana Corporation v. Eaton Corporation and Clark Equipment Company, civil action C85-
7210, Northern District ofOhio.
60 For historical surveys, see U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly, StaffReport, A Study ofthe Antitrust Laws (Washington: USGPO: 1956); and
Simon N. Whitney, Antitrust Policies: American Experience in Twenty Industries (New York:
Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), vol. I, Chapter 8.
17quantity ofparts they would order, even when the parts were unwanted. In this way,
the manufacturers sought to realize high prices and profits through the monopoly
power they derived from the combination of consumer and franchisee lock-in. This
worked to the disadvantage not only of consumers, but also of independent parts
manufacturers who sought to sell their own products, presumably at lower prices,
through auto dealerships.
After an extensive Federal Trade Commission investigation, General Motors agreed
in a 1941 consent decree that it would cease coercing its dealers to stock only
General Motors replacement partS. 61 However, General Motors (and later, other
leading auto manufacturers) were allowed to include in their franchise agreements
stipulations that the dealer would use and sell only the car manufacturer's parts when
they were "necessary to the mechanical operation ofan automobile, and which [were]
not available, in like quantity and'design, from other sources of supply." This left
considerable opportunity for disagreement over which parts met the stated
"mechanical operation" criteria. Two years later the FTC approved a General Motors
compliance 'report stating inter alia that GM's dealer contracts were changed to
require that for the affected parts, the dealer would not sell as genuine new General
Motors parts any parts that were not in fact "genuine." This led to further
ambiguities. For instance, many ofthe parts channeled by the auto manufacturers to
their dealers were produced by independent parts suppliers. The auto assemblers
stamped or packaged the parts they purchased as "genuine" when directing them
through their own marketing channels, but prevented the independent parts makers
from labelling their parts as "genuine" when they sold the same items directly to
franchised automobile dealers (or through independent auto parts wholesalers). To
help win the imprimatur of being "genuine," some parts manufacturers offered
discounts well in excess oflarge-scale-production cost savings on the parts sold to the
auto assemblers for original equipment (as distinguished from replacement)
installation. For example, the Champion Spark Plug Co. sold identical plugs to Ford
Motor Company at 6 cents each for original equipment insertion and at 22 cents for
replacement purposes.62 This allowed the three leading spark plug makers to secure
an 80 percent share of the replacement parts market even though they faced
approximately 40 competitors.
61 In re General Motors Corporation, 34 FTC 58 (1941).
62 In the Matter of Champion Spark Plug Company, 50 FTC. 30 (July 1953). See also two
parallel cases -- In the Matter ofGeneral Motors Corp. et at (i.e., regarding AC spark plugs),
50 FTC. 54 (1953); and In the Matter of The Electric Auto-Lite Company, 50 F.T.C. 73
(1953). In its preoccupation with protecting competing distributors from one another, the
F.T.C. condemned price discrimination on sales to different distributors but let stand the much
greater differentiation ofprices on original equipment, as distinguished from replacement part,
uses.
18The federal antitrust enforcement agencies struggled for years, but in the end without
noteworthy success, to unscramble the complex problems posed by an essentially
unavoidable circumstance: the automobile assemblers' control over the specifications
for their parts and the power they wield over their franchised dealers.63 To the extent
that dealers have been able to stock mechanical (or more recently, electronic) parts
from competitive independent sources, it has been mainly because the ability ofthe
auto assemblers to terminate franchises arbitrarily is constrained by Dealer Day in
Court laws.
The Federal Trade Commission broke its spear again in an attempt to eliminate
anticompetitive distortions in the vertical channels through which automobile "crash
parts" are distributed.64 There the problem entailed not market access for those who
produced replacement parts (i.e., the automobile assemblers and independent firms to
whom they had issued production contracts), but restricted ability to purchase parts
for the roughly 32,000 independent body shops EIBSs) who competed with franchised
auto dealerships in the repair ofdamaged automobile bodies. Because the dies from
which auto body parts are stamped are durable but enonnously expensive, it is
difficult (but not impossible) for independent firms to cut new dies and produce parts
that compete with the original manufacturer's fenders, door panels, and rear decks.65
The stamped "crash" parts must then find their way to franchised dealers and
independent body shops. After one round of government interventions, General
Motors implemented a system (imitated with minor variations by other auto
assemblers) under which its dealers not only purchased from GM warehouses crash
parts for their own use, but served as wholesalers for neighboring IBSs. GM sold
parts for its dealers' use at 40 percent offlist price (with a further 5 percent discount
for stock orders), but granted to dealers an additional 15 percent discount on parts
they supplied as wholesalers to IBSs. Under this system, two problems arose. First,
the franchised dealers typically did not grant the independent body shops the full 40
63 As a Senate staff report concluded in 1956, "The effectiveness of the [Federal Trade]
Commission's 1941 cease and desist order against General Motors can only be measured by its
applicability and enforceability. It appears that the Commission's order fails both tests." A
Study ofthe Antitrust Laws, supra note 60, at p. 101.
64 In the matter ofGeneral Motors Corporation, 99 F.T.C. 464 (1982).
65 There are three main sources ofcompetition: junk yards, "chop shops" that steal cars to order
for their parts, and a quite new phenomenon -- factories that take contour measurements ofthe
part to be imitated and program numerically controlled milling machines to produce relatively
inexpensive dies. The auto manu-facturers have advertised aggressively that parts from the
third ofthese sources are inferior to their original equipment parts. It is unclear whether they
have taken more active steps to discourage their franchised dealers from using them. Such
parts, often produced outside the United States, are now used extensively by independent body
shops.
19percent discount that would put the competing IBSs on an equal footing; the average
discount was nearer 27 percent. Second, the dealers sometimes claimed the 15
percent wholesaler discount on parts they were in fact using internally. This
enhanced their cost advantage over the independents, inhibiting the ability ofthe IBSs
to) compete for jobs and reimbursement by auto insurers. To level the playing field,
the Federal Trade Commission staffproposed that General Motors supply parts to its
dealers and IBSs from GM's decentralized parts warehouses on essentially equal
terms. General Motors argued inconclusively that this would be prohibitively
expensive.66 Weighing.the benefits ofenhanced competition from independent body
shops against the alleged but uncertain costs ofthe proposed new distribution system
and the likelihood that the new system would require extensive government
monitoring, three members ofthe Commission (with one dissenting) concluded that
"we cannot say that [GM's refusal to open its warehouses] is arbitrary and without
business justification."67 Thus, after more than a decade of investigation and
litigation, the Commission decided to attempt no change in what it recognized to be
an unsatisfactory status quo.
In these experiences there is once again a moral relevant to the disputes over access
to Japanese repair parts markets. The vertical channels through which automobile
parts reach ultimate consumers are characterized by extremely complex inter-firm
relationships. There are good business reasons for exclusivity and for concentrating
one's outside purchases on entities with whom one has developed strong
relationships; there are also bad (i.e., anticompetitive) reasons. It is hard to sort them
out, and it would be harder yet to monitor a system ofrules that imposed open access
upon unwilling participants. Except in the most egregious cases, the U.S. antitrust
agencies have not had much success in their attempts to pry open vertical channels
and facilitate the entry of new competitors. The U.S. auto manufacturers and
(sometimes, as in the crash parts case) their dealers have vigorously opposed
governmental efforts to alter vertical distribution practices. It would be unreasonable
and perhaps hypocritical to expect that the Japanese Fair Trade Commission or a
(presently non-existent) supra-national competition policy authority would experience
greater success in applying antitrust law to reform Japanese auto parts purchasing
practices.
66 In the early stages ofthe case, the author visited as FTC chief economist a General Motors
body parts warehouse for an inspection of order-filling facilities and procedures. There was
little evidence that major changes would be required to accommodate pickups by mss.
67 99 FTC. 464,610.
204 The Distribution ofPhotographic Film and Paper
Eastman Kodak's May 1995 petition seeking Section 301 relief against Fuji ofJapan
was accompanied by a 300-page brief alleging several categories ofunfair practices
that inhibited Kodak's access to Japanese photographic film and paper markets.68 At
first, Kodak's sales were restricted by quantitative import limits (until 1960), high
tariffs (e.g., on color film, 40 percent in 1964, reduced to 16 percent in 1973 and
phased out completely by 1990), and prohibitions on foreign direct investment in
Japan (relaxed in 1971 to permit 50-50 joint ventures and eliminated in 1976). As
tariffs and foreign direct investment restraints were phased down during the 1970s,
Fuji is alleged to have embarked, with the advice and consent of MITI, upon a
campaign to consolidate its control over retail distribution channels through four
exclusive primary wholesalers (tokuyakuten), who in turn supply several hundred
secondary wholesalers serving smaller retail outlets. Sales ofphotographic printing
paper are said to have been insulated through- Fuji's ownership of, or financial
interlocks with, large numbers ofprocessing laboratories. Exclusive dealing in Fuji
film and papers by secondary wholesalers, retail outlets, and laboratories is' said to
have been encouraged by rebates conditional upon meeting stringent sales volume
targets and efforts to sustain dealer loyalty through the maintenance of high resale
prices. These vertical restraints were orchestrated by Fuji, Kodak alleges, with the
knowledge and acquiescence of Japan's Fair Trade Commission, the agency
responsible for enforcing Japan's Anti-Monopoly Law. Fuji's substantial control over
the vertical channels through which photographic materials reach consumers, Kodak
argues, has made it difficult for foreign firms to gain appreciable market shares in the
Japanese market.
In an even longer reply brief,69 Fuji flatly denies many of the historical "facts"
asserted by Kodak -- e.g., the timing of Fuji's development of exclusive wholesaler
relationships, the exclusivity ofits secondary wholesalers, the size and structure ofits
rebates, the existence ofresale price maintenance, and the failure of the Fair Trade
Commission to enforce Japan's anti-monopoly law against Fuji. These facets ofthe
dispute cannot detain us here. I focus instead on two more fundamental assertions by
Fuji: that a principal cause of Kodak's difficulties in Japan lay in Kodak's own
distribution channel strategy errors, and that the lack of artificial trade barriers in
Japan is shown by the symmetry ofFuji's position in America to Kodak's position in
Japan.
68 Privatizing Protection: Japanese Market Barriers in Consumer Photographic Film and
Consumer Photographic Paper, memorandum prepared by Dewey Ballantine, May 1995.
69 Rewriting History: Kodak's Revisionist Account of the Japanese Consumer Photographic
Market, report prepared by Willkie Farr & Gallagher, July 31, 1995.
214.1 Symmetric Market Positions
Taking up the latter point first, Kodak claims as evidence that it has been treated
unfairly the fact that Fuji retains a 70 percent share of photographic film sales in
Japan while Kodak, despite vigorous market penetration efforts, held only a nine
percent share in 1994.70 In Europe and other parts ofthe world (excluding the United
States), on the other hand, Kodak's market share substantially exceeds Fuji's. Fuji
argues in return that despite its own strenuous efforts to gain ground, its share of
color film sales in the United States has fluctuated between 9 and 13 percent, while
Kodak's share is 71 percent.71 Thus, Fuji continues, "unless one also concludes that
Fujifilm's low share in the United States reflects the continuing presence ofsignificant
market barriers in the U.S. market," one strains logic in concluding from market share
disparities that there are unfair barriers to Kodak's sales in Japan.72
4.2 Access to Small Retailers
From the differences between retail distribution outlets in Japan and the United
States, one would expect it to be more difficult for a small manufacturer or new
entrant to secure wide retail distribution in Japan than in the United States. Japan's
retail outlets, we have seen, are characteristically smaller and more numerous than
their counterparts in the United States. Photographic film is sold in approximately
400,000 Japanese retail establishments.73 With severely limited shelf and inventory
storage space, small stores are likely to specialize in the products of only a single
manufacturer -- usually, the best-known'brand.74 They also buy from the secondary
wholesalers Fuji is alleged to dominate~ only the high-volume outlets purchase
directly from the manufacturer.75 Kodak states that it has experienced greater
difficulty gaining access to small retailers, especially those in rural areas, than to large
retailers, supermarkets, and convenience stores.76 Fuji claims that it faces the same
70 Privatizing Protection. supra note 68, at p. 1.
71 Rewriting HistOlY, supra note 69, at p. 156, Fuji's brief notes that Kodak's share of sales in
Japan has fluctuated between 9 and 13 percent in recent years.
72 Rewriting HistOlY, supra note 69, at pp. 18-19.
73 Privatizing Protection, supra note 68, at p. 5.
74 See Privatizing Protection, supra note 68, p. 151.
75 Privatizing Protection, supra note 68, p. 5.
76 Privatizing Protection, supra note 68, at pp. 130 and 146. In its second-round reply brief, Fuji
reports survey evidence showing that although Kodak film was not available in the majority of
smaller outlets, such outlets account for only a modest fraction -- approximately one-fourth --
22obstacles in the United States.77 But with relatively more film sold through large
discount houses, pharmacy chains, and convenience store chains in the United States,
it should be easier for a new or small firm to secure access through direct
manufacturer-to-retailer sales.
This expectation was confirmed, with some surprises, through a non-random survey
conducted by the author during two weeks of August 1995. Each retail outlet the
author visited in that period was checked to see whether photographic film was
carried, and, if so, which brands. A few stores that otherwise would have.been
bypassed by were included in the expectation that they would sell photo supplies.
Table 1 summarizes the results. All eleven outlets carried a range ofKodak products.
Eight ofthe eleven carried Polaroid instant-photo film -- a product for which Kodak
had no close substitute. Fuji brand film was carried by only three of the eleven; a
fourth carried the film ofFuji's Japanese rival, Konica. Three ofthe four were large
outlets with extensive photographic supplies- inventories. At the well-known
Cambridge photo supplies specialist, there was a special display of Fuji films,
prominently located; in the large discount house, there was also a sizeable Fuji
display, but it was so far above normal eye level that one would observe it only by
accident or careful search. At the food supermarket, only one in every three checkout
displays included film items. The few Fuji items included both film and Quik-Snap
cameras. Two other outlets carried Fuji Quik-Snap disposable cameras -- a product
Fuji pioneered -- but no separately packaged Fuji film. To the extent that the results
ofthis survey can be generalized, it seems clear that Kodak is able to attain virtually
ubiquitous distribution in its home market, whereas foreigners place their film
products mainly on the shelves of high-volume outlets.78 Except in the case of the
food supermarket, the success of foreign film producers does not appear to depend
upon whether or not a store belongs to a chain. High unit film sales explain foreign
film stocking better than large-scale, possibly multi-unit, purchasing.
4.3 First-MoverAdvantages and Newcomer Strategy Choices
Kodak's ability to be the film ofchoice for small U.S. retailers, when only one brand
can be stocked, and Fuji's similar ability in Japan, are almost surely the result ofwhat
oftotal film sales in Japan. Kodak film was available in more than 92 percent ofthe Tokyo
stores, 66 percent ofthe Osaka and Kyoto stores; and 51 percent ofthe provincial city stores
selling 2,000 or more rolls of film per year. Fujifilm's Rebuttal Regarding the Alleged
"Distribution Bottleneck" briefsubmitted by Willkie Farr & Gallagher, December 21, 1995, pp.
2 and 34. .
77 Rewriting History, supra note 69, at pp. 89 and 159.
78 Compare note 76 supra, revealing a similar pattern ofKodak penetration in Japanese stores.
23economists recognized as the pioneers in their markets are able to maintain sizeable
market shares, often despite charging premium prices; and secure favorable
placement on retailers' shelves while spending substantially less per dollar ofsales on
advertising and other fonns of promotion than their smaller, late-entrant rivals.??
First-mover advantages appear to be particularly potent in consumer goods industries,
especially when it is difficult to tell from mere inspection, i.e., without actual
consumption experience, whether a product is of superior quality and when inferior
quality can impose significant costs upon the consumer (e.g., in the case of photos,
when a unique experience is recorded unsuccessfully).80
Brands that are well-established in their home markets have a natural first-mover
advantage over newcomers, including imported products. Plainly, however, imports
succeed in overcoming incumbents' first-mover advantage in at least a substantial
class ofcases. A key question is, how?
For at least the most cosmopolitan consumers -- presumably, a modest minority ofall
consumers -- foreign brands have a panache that leads to preference over local
brands, other things (such as quality) being held equal. From my first trip to Japan, I
remember vividly being told that it would b~ almost insulting to offer my interpreter a
gift ofSuntory whiskey, even though its intrinsic quality was considered to be equal
to that of foreign Scotch whiskeys. The gift .had to be a more expensive leading
Scotch brand. This "snob appeal" effect apparently applies over a wider array of
imported brands in Japan. How important it is quantitatively is unclear.
79 See Ronald Bond and David Lean, Sales Promotion and Product Differentiation in Two
Prescription Drug Markets (Federal Trade Commission Staff Report: 1977); and Robert D.
Buzzell and Paul W. Farris, "Marketing Costs in Consumer Goods Industries," in Hans 1.
Thorelli, ed., Strategy + Structure == Performance (Indiana University Press: 1977), pp.·122-
145.
80 See Richard Schmalensee, "Product Differentiation Advantages of Pioneering Brands," 72
American Economic Review 349 (June 1982).
24Table 1: Photographic Film Brand Coverage ofEleven Stores: August 1995
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Store Type Location Film BrQJI(Js SIOf;ked
Large, well-known single- unit Cambridge, MA Kodak, Fuji, Polaroid, Ilford
photo equipment and supplies
specialist
Photo equipment specialist, Cambridge, MA Kodak, Polaroid, Fuji
unit ofchain, in large (Quik-Snap camera only)
shopping mall
Small photo supplies and Charlestown, MA Kodak, Polaroid
processing outlet, single-unit
Discount house; largest unit Cambridge, MA Kodak, Fuji, Polaroid,
oflocal chain Konica
Large retail phannacy, unit Charlestown, MA Kodak, Polaroid,
ofleading chain Japanese private-label
Large retail phannacy. prime Brookline, MA Kodak, Polaroid, Konica
location, single-unit
Small retail phannacy, off Brookline, MA Kodak
location, single-unit
Large food supennarket, Charlestown, MA Kodak, Fuji, Polaroid
part oflocal chain
Convenience store, part ofregional Charlestown, MA Kodak, Polaroid, Fuji
chain (Quik-Snap camera only)
News shop at resort Hot Springs, VA Kodak
News shop, Logan Airport Boston, MA Kodak
25One way a first-mover advantage can be lost, often with dramatic rapidity, is to be
caught delivering products of demonstrably inferior quality. Shoddy workmanship
operated to the disadvantage of American automobiles and to the advantage of
Japanese imports during the late 1970s and early 1980s.81 There is also an example
from photographic film sales in Japan. Fuji was not always the leading J~panese
manufacturer. Konica lost its dominant position when it marketed a defective new
film during the mid 1950s and refused to offer replacements to dissatisfied
consumers.82 Within three years, Fuji's market share had risen from 20 to 60 percent.
Absent quality slips by leading incumbents, newcomers are most apt to overcome
strongly-entrenched first-mover advantages through innovation -- e.g., by introducing
technologically superior new products.83 Fuji's shelf position in smaller U.S. outlets
appears attributable in part to an innovation -- its disposable "Quik-Snap" camera.84
Fuji attributes its strong presence in Japan in part to that innovation and also to its
two-year lead over Kodak in introducing ISO 400-film with resolution equivalent to
slower ISO 100 film. 85 Kodak's most rapid penetration into the Japanese market
(during the 1970s) came with the introduction of an innovative 110 fonnat film. 86
Kodak's brief seeking Section 301 redress states that Fuji moved from a position of
technological inferiority to rough technological parity with Kodak in the late 1970s.87
During the next decade, F~lji sought to increase its U.S. market share by introducing
new color film emulsions that were brighter, faster, and more fine-grained than
Kodak's.88 Kodak significantly increased its R&D expenditures and, in an interaction
process that resembled a qualitative arms race, it retaliated quickly to most ofthese
81 See Fred Mannering and Clifford Winston, "Brand Loyalty and the Decline of American
Automobile Firms," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1991, pp. 67-
103.
82 Privatizing Protection, supra note 68, at p. 63.
83 This phenomeno~ was first demonstrated empirically by Bond and Lean, supra note 80.
84 According to Rewriting History, supra note 69, at p. 191, Kodak responded in Japan to Fuji's
innovation with its own disposable product, but with a lag oftwo years.
85 Rewriting History, supra note 69, at 188-190.
86 Rewriting History, supra note 69, at p. 57.
87 Privatizing Protection, supra note 68, at p. 63.
88 See F. M. Scherer, International High-Technology Competition (Harvard University Press:
1992), p. 77.
26Fuji initiatives. Kodak's fast but costly responses were undoubtedly one reason why
Fuji failed to attain its declared 15 percent U.S. market share goal.
These technological efforts were accompanied by heavy expenditures on advertising
and other aspects of product promotion. Fuji asserts that it has invested more to
promote its product entries into the U.S. market than Kodak spent in Japan.89 The
data available, on this claim are insufficient to evaluate its validity.
Another possible means ofovercoming first-mover advantages is for the newcomer to
set its price below the level to which incumbents are willing to descend, hoping
thereby to avoid a price war. Between 1971 and 1974 and again between 1979 and
1981, Kodak's prices in Japan were reduced, first when tariffs fell and then when Fuji
raised its prices following abrupt increases in the price ofsilver (used in photographic
emulsions).90 On both occasions, Kodak made substantial market share gains,
achieving an all-time peak Japanese film market share of 18 percent. However,
Kodak then shifted back to ahigh-price policy, refraining from price reductions even
after 1986, when the dollar dropped sharply in value relative to the yen and Kodak's
yen cost of film delivered to Japan from the U.S. fell. There were at least three
plausible reasons for its more recent pricing strategy choice.91 Kodak may have been
fearful of triggering a price war~ it may have preferred to realize high profits on
modest volume over sacrificing profit margins to gain volume~ and/or it may have
feared that reducing prices would signal that Kodak's film was of inferior quality
relative Fuji's.92 However, in 1995, after filing its Section 301 complaint against Fuji,
Kodak effected a 50 percent price reduction on a new film carrying the brand names
of both Kodak and a Japanese wholesale chain, Nichiryu.93 This is presumably a
market segmentation strategy, under which Kodak strives to gain market share
through price-cutting on one brand while attempting through product differentiation to
avert image-impairing spillover harm to its main brand.
89 Rewriting History, supra note 69, at p. 179.
90 See Privatizing Protection, supra note 68, pp. 105-106 and 124-130; and Rewriting History,
supra note 69, pp. 168-172.
91 See the quotation in Rewriting History, supra note 69, at p. 13.
92 On similar "signalling quality through price" strategies in automobiles and beer, see·F. M.
Scherer, Industry Structure Strategy and Public Policy (New York: HarperCollins: 1996), pp.
302-303 and 400-403.
93 "Kodak ofJapan To Halve Price," New York Times, August 24, 1995, p. D8.
274.4 Access to Wholesale Distribution Channels
A key component in Kodak's claim is that its market access to Japan has been unfairly
restricted through exclusive dealing by the four primary wholesalers used by Fuji in
distributing its film to retailers. These tokuyakuten, it is argued, achieve much more
complete market coverage than Kodak's wholesalers. Fuji replies that photographic
supplies distribution was gravitating toward exclusivity long before traditional trade
and investment barriers fell during the 1970s, that Kodak (along with Konica) also
chose to develop their own exclusive wholesalers, and that Kodak's loss of a
particularly important wholesaler to Fuji resulted from a flawed strategic decision by
Kodak.
The briefs ofKodak and Fuji are at odds on the reasons for Kodak's early distribution
strategy weakness.94 Kodak was "reportedly" forced by the Japanese government in
1960 to select a single principal wholesaler to handle its imports, apparently because
exclusive distribution would facilitate governmental control of import volumes.
Kodak chose Nagase & Co., a specialist in wholesaling chemical products to
industry. Although Nagase subsequently built expertise in photo supplies
wholesaling, it continued to be less effective than Fuji's wholesalers. Fuji asserts that
after the liberalization measures ofthe 1970s, Kodak could have bought a 50 percent
or greater ownership share in Nagase or another wholesaler and built up its marketing
potential. It refrained from doing so until 1984, when it purchased Nagase's Kodak
division and established a Kodak-owned wholesale channe1.95 According to the first
president of Japan's Kodak operation, "The glaring mistake was waiting so long to
take aggressive action in this market. We should have been here with [company-
owned distribution channels] ten years ago [i.e., in 1978]."96
Kodak acknowledges making a further strategic error in its wholesale distribution
strategy.97 During the early 1970s, Japan's leading tokuyakuten, Asanuma, was not
exclusive. It sold an estimated 5 billion yen ofKodak products as well as 18 billion
94 Compare Privatizing Protection, supra note 68, p. 68; and Rewriting Ristoty, supra note 69,
pp. 180-182.
95 For a first-hand account ofthe merger negotiations by the person Kodak assigned in 1984 to
become president of its Japanese operations, see Albert L. Sieg, The Tokyo Chronicles: An
American Gaijin Reveals the Hidden Truths ofJapanese Life and Business (Essex Junction, VT:
Oliver Wright, 1995), pp. 101-108.
96 Rewriting Ristoty, supra note 69, pp. 182-183, quoting Albert Sieg from a Look magazine
interview.
97 Compare Privatizing Protection, supra note 68, pp. 93 and 116-118; and Rewriting Ristoty,
supra note 69, pp. 9-10, 37, 67-69, and 175-184.
28yen ofFuji products. Asanuma was unhappy, however, having to obtain its Kodak
products through Nagase. When Kodak's 110 Instamatic camera was marketed in
Japan, Asanuma preferred the Kodak camera and film over Fuji's imitation, but
Nagase refused to·assure Asanuma ofsufficient supplies to meet the latter's projected
needs wholesaling only Kodak and not Fuji Instamatics. According to the Fuji brief,
Asanuma officials travelled to Rochester·in 1973 to seek a direct purchase
arrangement with Kodak, but they were rebuffed. It would appear that this trip
preceded Nagase's refusal to assure Instamatic film supplies to Asanuma. What is
clear is that in 1975, Japan's most powerful tokuyakuten decided on the basis ofthese
experiences to become an exclusive Fuji wholesaler. Attributing Nagase's Instamatic
decision (apparently, unilaterally, without consulting Kodak) to fear ofAsanuma as "a
powerful competitive threat," and lamenting the "fatal" circumstances that led to the
loss ofan important opportunity, Kodak's briefsays that "Kodak did not even learn of
the opportunity it had missed until many years later."98
What is striking to this observer, but not made explicit in either party's briefs, is that
the events of1973-75 reflected a colossal failure ofintelligence (in the military sense)
at Kodak. Kodak had no employee in Japan at the time who could read contemporary
Japanese trade press accounts of the Nagase-Asanuma dispute, understand the
importance of securing Asanuma as a primary Kodak wholesaler, and intervene to
override Nagase's self-serving actions. Not until 1977 did Kodak open a liaison
office in Japan to oversee inter alia the activities of Nagase. Only in 1984 was a
permanent team dispatched from Rochester to "launch" Kodak-managed operations in
Japan.99 _In sharp contrast were the market-opening efforts of Volkswagen and
Toyota, who at the outset sent their own English-speaking personnel to the United
States, first to assess market opportunities and then to implement their entry
decisions.
The first-person account by Albert Sieg, Kodak's first Japanese subsidiary president,
reveals another important facet ofKodak's intelligence failure. 1oo At one ofthe many
social functions he was'obliged to attend, Mr. Sieg was approached politely by a
Japanese professional photographer and, after preliminary formalities, reproached for
the poor rendition' Kodak color film provided of black-haired Japanese subjects
wearing light-colored clothing. The film's color balance had be~n optimized for
98 Privatizing Protection, supra note 68, at p. 118.
99 See Sieg, supra note 96, especially pp. xi-xii and xviii.
100 Sieg, supra note 96, at 140-142. Mr. Sieg explains, "Because we had sold through third-party
distributors for the past forty years, we never got the kind of firsthand feedback that was
essential to satisfYing our customers -- feedback like the kind that Hatano-san offered us at the
New Year party."
29charactistically fairer American and European subjects. After investigating the
complaint further, Mr. Sieg persuaded Rochester to develop new emulsions better-
suited to the Japanese market. But this correction occurred only in the mid 1980s,
more than a decade after liberalization reduced tariff and direct foreign investment
barriers to Kodak's Japanese presence.
5 Conclusion
It is not easy for a would-be importer attempting to sell its wares in a foreign country
to obtain access to the necessary channels of distribution. Incumbents with well-
established brand reputations will normally have assimilated the most able
wholesalers and retailers. They may also have built up ties ofexclusivity with their
dealers -- ties that mayor may not have stepped beyond the bounds staked out under
local competition policies. Overcoming these hurdles requires intelligence and
determined, painstaking effort. Viable vertical channels can seldom be created
through brief jet-lagged visits during which distribution contracts, duly filtered
through interpreters, are negotiated and signed, after which responsibility is passed to
the new middlemen.
In my monograph on Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy,101 I lay
out a tentative proposal for rules establishing a line between permissible and
impermissible restraints of competition in international trade, to be agreed upon by
GATT signatory nations and enforced both by national authorities and, in cases of
conflict, by a prospective new office within the World Trade Organization. My
proposal would encompass, on a time-phased basis, export and import cartels, the
abuse of monopoly power by enterprises dominating a product line in international
trade, mergers that concentrate 40 percent or more ofinternational trade in a single
finn, domination ofworld trade for periods exceeding 20 years through the control of
intellectual property, and (in the final phase) "oth~r monopolistic practices that distqrt
international trade but not expressly covered by the policies [identified above]."
Although I acknowledged that vertical restraints could act as barriers to trade, I did
not include rules governing them in my explicit proposal, relegating them to the final-
phase catch-all cate~ory.
This choice was deliberate. Vertical restraints are recognized by both e~onomists and
competition policy authorities to have both benefits and competition-impeding
costs. 102 It is difficult to draw neat lines between those that should be allowed and
101 Supra note 20, Chapter 5.
102 For surveys ofthe economic literature, see F. M. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market
Structure and Economic Perfonnance (third ed.; Hughton-Miffiin: 1990), Chapter IS; and
Michael L. Katz, "Vertical Contractual Restraints," in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D.
Willig, eds., Handbook ofIndustrial Organization, vol. I (North-Holland, 1989), Chapter 11.
30those that should be prohibited. Even when those lines have been drawn, as my
analysis of U.S. antitrust policy toward automobile parts distribution has shown,
enforcement ofthe vertical restraints law has often been a muddle. If nations have
difficulty determining the correct policies and enforcing them within their own
borders, it will surely be much more difficult to adjudicate such policies
internationally -- either under a compact harmonizing competition policy rules, or
through aggressive unilateralism, i.e., the extraterritorial enforcement of domestic
antitrust laws against alleged violators overseas. This pessimistic conclusion may
leave an occasionally significant barrier to international trade untouched. But wisdom
in public policy analysis begins with the recognition that not all problems can be
solved.
For diverse views on the law, see Richard A. Posner, "The Rule ofReason and the Economic
Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision," 45 University ofChicago Law Review 1 (Fall
1977); the symposium on "The Economics ofVertical Restraints" in 52 Antitrust Law Journal
685-754 (1983); U.S. Department of Justice Vertical Restraints Guidelines, reprinted in 48
Antitrust & Trade Regulation Report special supplement (January 24, 1985) (rescinded in
1993); National Association ofAttorneys General Vertical Restraints Guidelines, reprinted in
68 Antitrust & Trade Regulation Report special supplement (March 30, 1995); and Warren S.
Grimes, "Spiff, Polish, and Consumer Demand Quality: Vertical Price Restraints Revisited," 80
California Law Review 817 (July 1992).
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